Simplified Verifiable Re-encryption Mix-nets

Shinsuke Tamura^1, and Shuji Taniguchi¹

¹Graduate School of Engineering, University of Fukui, Fukui, Japan

Cite this paper:
Shinsuke Tamura and Shuji Taniguchi. Simplified Verifiable Re-encryption Mix-nets. Information Security and Computer Fraud. 2013; 1(1):1-7. doi: 10.12691/iscf-1-1-1

Abstract

Under the assumption that numbers of data that are encrypted and decrypted are sufficiently large and final decryption results of individual data can be publicly disclosed, a simplified mechanism for implementing re-encryption type verifiable mix-nets is proposed. Different from already proposed mechanisms, in which mix-servers prove their honest encryptions while concealing their encryption parameters, mix-servers in the proposed scheme simply disclose their aggregate encryption parameter values. As a consequence anyone can verify encryption results without interacting with mix-servers. Also, its primary verification procedures examine only aggregate behavior of mix-servers, in other words, it does not examine correct encryptions of individual data. Therefore computation volumes required for mix-servers to prove their correct behaviors are reduced substantially. In addition, the proposed scheme can cope with various attacks from malicious entities more effectively than optimistic verifiable mix-nets that also examine only aggregate behaviors of mix-nets.

Keywords:
anonymous communication privacy e-voting systems e-poll systems

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