Evaluating the Impact of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs: Evidence from Morocco

Marouane IKIRA^1, and Abdeljaouad EZZRARI²

¹Département des sciences économiques et gestion, Université Hassan II, Casablanca, Morocco

²Observatoire des conditions de vie de la population, Haut-Commissariat au Plan, Rabat, Morocco

Cite this paper:
Marouane IKIRA and Abdeljaouad EZZRARI. Evaluating the Impact of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs: Evidence from Morocco. American Journal of Educational Research. 2021; 9(5):320-329. doi: 10.12691/education-9-5-10

Abstract

In many developing countries, conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs have a significant social impact. They seek to combat poverty through redistributive transfers, and to combat transmission of poverty through generations by investing in human capital in the form of children. Several studies show that these programs have succeeded in increasing the demand for education and reducing child labor. This paper aims to assess the impact of Morocco’s conditional cash transfer program (Tayssir) on school attendance and labor of rural children aged 6 to 15 years. Using data from the Household Panel Survey conducted by the National Observatory for Human Development (ONDH), we estimate first an Average-treatment-Effect (ATE) by using Propensity Score Matching. This initial analysis shows that Tayssir has significantly increased enrollment rates and reduced child labor. In order to refine the analysis and due to non-compliance with the criteria of eligibility, we also estimate a Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) by using the eligibility rule as an instrumental variable. This second analysis shows that Tayssir has had no significant effect on children whose participation was assigned under the eligibility rule (the compliers). This suggests that the program requires additional measures.

Keywords:
conditional cash transfers instrumental variable estimation local average treatment effect tayssir propensity score matching

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