1Law Department, National Economics University, Ha Noi, Vietnam
2International School, Thai Nguyen University, Thai Nguyen, Vietnam
Journal of Finance and Economics.
2020,
Vol. 8 No. 4, 190-200
DOI: 10.12691/jfe-8-4-5
Copyright © 2020 Science and Education PublishingCite this paper: Tran Thi Nguyet, Tran Anh Vu. Control of the Agreement on Valuation to Restrict Competition in Vietnam - Viewed from Efficiency Standards of Economics.
Journal of Finance and Economics. 2020; 8(4):190-200. doi: 10.12691/jfe-8-4-5.
Correspondence to: Tran Anh Vu, International School, Thai Nguyen University, Thai Nguyen, Vietnam. Email:
vuta@tnu.edu.vnAbstract
The article presents in detail the basic theoretical contents of price-fixing agreement, provides analysis by drawings, graphs and specific examples, and discusses price-fixing agreement acts, including: direct price-fixing agreement, indirect price-fixing agreement, price-using agreement to consolidate positions in the relevant market. From these theoretical contents and analysis, the author offers a number of assessments and proposes solutions to adjust Vietnam's competition laws in order to control price-fixing agreements to restrict competition, viewed from the efficiency standards of economics. Some of the issues discussed are: (1) Perfectly competitive market and monopoly market; (2) Direct price-fixing agreements to restrict competition from the viewpoint of economic efficiency; (3) Indirect price-fixing agreements to restrict competition; (4) Price-using agreements to consolidate its position in the relevant market. After offering analysis, discussion and research on issues of price fixing agreements, the article has made a number of author's recommendations on effect assessment content or the ability to cause significant anti-competitive effect of price fixing agreement to restraint competition in Vietnam.
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