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<records>
  <record>
    <language>eng</language>
    <publisher>Science and Education Publishing</publisher>
    <journalTitle>Information Security and Computer Fraud</journalTitle>
    <eissn>2376-9629</eissn>
    <publicationDate>2015-12-02</publicationDate>
    <volume>3</volume>
    <issue>2</issue>
    <startPage>32</startPage>
    <endPage>38</endPage>
    <doi>10.12691/iscf-3-2-2</doi>
    <publisherRecordId>ISCF2015322</publisherRecordId>
    <documentType>article</documentType>
    <title language="eng">An Incoercible E-Voting Scheme Based on Revised Simplified Verifiable Re-encryption Mix-nets</title>
    <authors>
      <author>
        <name>Shinsuke Tamura</name>
        <email>tamura@u-fukui.ac.jp</email>
        <affiliationId>1</affiliationId>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Hazim A. Haddad</name>
        <affiliationId>1</affiliationId>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Nazmul Islam</name>
        <affiliationId>2</affiliationId>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Kazi Md. Rokibul Alam</name>
        <affiliationId>2</affiliationId>
      </author>
    </authors>
    <affiliationsList>
      <affiliationName affiliationId="1">Graduate School of Engineering, University of Fukui, Japan</affiliationName>
      <affiliationName affiliationId="2">Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Khulna University of Engineering and Technology, Bangladesh</affiliationName>
    </affiliationsList>
    <abstract language="eng">Simplified verifiable re-encryption mix-net (SVRM) is revised and a scheme for e-voting systems is developed based on it. The developed scheme enables e-voting systems to satisfy all essential requirements of elections. Namely, they satisfy requirements about privacy, verifiability, fairness and robustness. It also successfully protects voters from coercers except cases where the coercers force voters to abstain from elections. In detail, voters can conceal correspondences between them and their votes, anyone can verify the accuracy of election results, and interim election results are concealed from any entity. About incoercibility, provided that erasable-state voting booths which disable voters to memorize complete information exchanged between them and election authorities for constructing votes are available, coercer C cannot know candidates that voters coerced by C had chosen even if the candidates are unique to the voters. In addition, elections can be completed without reelections even when votes were handled illegitimately.</abstract>
    <fullTextUrl format="pdf">http://pubs.sciepub.com/iscf/3/2/2/iscf-3-2-2.pdf</fullTextUrl>
    <keywords language="eng">
      <keyword>revised-SVRM</keyword>
      <keyword>anonymous credential</keyword>
      <keyword>inferior votes</keyword>
      <keyword>erasable-state voting booth</keyword>
    </keywords>
  </record>
</records>