Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance Dispersion

Frederick Adjei^1, , Mavis Adjei² and Fred Adjei³

¹Economics and Finance Department, Southeast Missouri State University

²Marketing Department, Southern Illinois University Carbondale

³2Marketing Department, Southern Illinois University Carbondale

Cite this paper:
Frederick Adjei, Mavis Adjei and Fred Adjei. Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance Dispersion. Journal of Finance and Economics. 2017; 5(1):11-17. doi: 10.12691/jfe-5-1-2

Abstract

This study, using a fixed effects model, empirically investigates the relationship between corporate governance and corporate performance dispersion. Suggesting a negative relationship, [1] theorize that when corporate governance improves there is a decrease in shareholder oversight which could permit greater managerial discretion to execute conservative investment policies leading to a decrease in corporate risk taking and hence a decrease in performance dispersion. For a positive link, [2], employing agency theory, contend that with poor corporate governance, managers may choose conservative investment policies for career preservation concerns, giving up value-enhancing risky projects. Our findings indicate that the Gompers and Bebchuk governance indices (institutional ownership) are negatively (positively) associated with the standard deviation of monthly stock returns. The results also indicate that better corporate governance is associated with higher as well as more variable capital expenditures and R&D spending. These findings are consistent with the argument that management of better governed firms behave optimally, follow more aggressive investment policies, leading to the increased dispersion of corporate performance.

Keywords:
corporate governance corporate performance

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